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Abstract
Collective “memories” of the original democracy of classical Athens have inspired the formation of the 
direct-democracy, “Syntagma Square” movement. The movement, a reaction to the ongoing social crisis 
in Greece, challenges the legitimacy of the liberal, representative, democracy accusing the “memorandum 
party system” for immoral contact and treasonous collaboration with Greece’s foreign debtors. Taking 
this development as an opportunity to examine in situ a modern version of “direct democracy” and the 
cognitive patterns that animate it, the essay compares ancient and current democratic processes and reflects 
on their ontological and cosmological presuppositions. Employing the Weberian concept of “acosmistic 
brotherhood” the essay analytically explores and compares the two democratic instances and reflects on 
the foundations of a stable democratic regime.
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Visions of Brotherhood.  
Un análisis comparativo de la democracia directa 
en la Grecia antigua y moderna
Resumen
La memoria colectiva de la democracia de la Antigua Grecia ha sido la inspiradora de los movimientos 
de democracia  directa de la plaza Sintagma. Estos movimientos, entendidos como una respuesta a la 
creciente crisis en Grecia, cuestionan la legitimidad de la democracia liberal representativa, a la que se 
acusa de “memorándum del sistema de partidos” debido a su relación inmoral y alevosa con los acreedores 
extranjeros de Grecia. Tomando estos hechos como una oportunidad para examinar in situ una versión 
moderna de la democracia directa, este trabajo compara los procesos democráticos antiguos y modernos 
y reflexiona sobre sus presupuestos ontológicos y cosmológicos. A partir del concepto weberiano de 
“Liebesakosmismus”, el ensayo explora analíticamente y compara los dos momentos democráticos y 
reflexiona sobre las bases de un régimen democrático estable.
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Introduction
The ongoing economic crisis that erupted in Greece in 2009, and that by 2011 had turned 
into a legitimation crisis of the political system, gave rise to the “Syntagma Square” 
movement, also known as the “Greek indignados” (Οι αγανακτισμένοι); a movement 
that challenged parliamentary-representative democracy, promulgating, at the same 
time, a return to “direct democracy” which they traced back to classical Athens and the 
celebrated rule of the people. The presence of this social movement, notwithstanding 
its short-lived existence gave us the opportunity to examine two interrelated issues: 
has the ancient direct democracy, as an institution and practice, anything to do with 
its modern proponents? And if so, what can we learn about us moderns from such 
comparison? 
In the following pages I will present some aspects of the classical Athenian democracy 
in conjunction with some recent studies of the contemporary Greek movement for the 
restoration of republican, direct-democracy, practices. Following a Weberian model of 
analysis, I will reflect on the two anthropological types of citizen and their ability to 
sustain a democratic regime. 
1. The political model of classical Athens
The presence and function of direct democracy in ancient Athens is related to (a) the 
actual presence of direct participation; (b) the process of selecting magistrates by lot; 
and (c) whether Athenian democracy was concerned with “social justice”, or to be more 
precise, concerned with the redistribution of wealth for the benefit of the lower classes.1
First, let us examine the issue concerning of actual, tangible, presence of the direct 
participation of citizens in decision making, vis-à-vis the process of representative 
democratic institutions. In this case we need to contrast the regular physical presence 
of citizens in the meeting-place of decision-taking, as well as the free expression of 
opinion of those present, vis-à-vis the consultation of the few elected representatives. 
In the first case, citizens directly chose and vote for the issue at stake, following a few 
and simple rules mostly concerning time restrictions for the speakers. In the second 
case, the citizens authorize a small number of fellow-citizens to take decisions on 
their behalf, with term of office (usually four years) following strictly pre-determined 
rules of discussion and rules for decision-taking. As the argument goes, the system 
of representation is prone to perversion and corruption. Even in the absence of such 
inefficiencies, the representative system encourages the development of a political elite 
(or cast) which cares more about their own interests rather than the interests of those 
who they represent. Let us examine in detail the Athenian system.
For starters, the Ecclesia of demos in classical Athens, i.e. the institutionalized 
assembly of citizens, was neither gathered voluntarily, nor very often. It was assembled 
by the prytaneis (πρυτάνεις), that is, by the fifty representatives of the “tribe”, which 
1 The following is primarily based on the analysis of the Athenian democracy by Kyrtatas 
(2014), and Hansen (1991).
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was in charge of the institution, every month (the Athenian demos was divided in ten 
municipals “tribes”, each one represented by fifty bouleutes), according to strict rules, 
and no more than forty times a year. Then, during the Ecclesia sessions, everyone had, in 
principle, the right to speak, but the political ethics of the day, the necessary preparation 
and the cruelty of the crowd, did not allow ordinary citizens to discuss any matter they 
wished to (Adkins, 1972: 250-267). Those who gathered at the Ecclesia did not have the 
right to suggest any possible topic of discussion and debate. The drafting of the agenda 
was strictly the prerogative of the fifty prytaneis. More important, the various issues 
were not suggested by the prytaneis openly and unconditionally. They were already 
discussed extensively in the Boule (Βουλή) of the five hundred which codified the 
possible decisions and choices in certain drafts, the probouleumata (προβουλεύματα). 
The Ecclesia itself was commending and discussing on the matters already on pre-
arranged proposals. The most the Ecclesia could do was to ask the Boule to draft laws 
and decisions and to propose amendments to those presented to them. Last, and probably 
more important, not all citizens were assembled in the Ecclesia; instead, only 1/5 or 
even 1/10 of the eligible citizens were present at any time depending on the importance 
of the subject (Hansen, 1991: 130-132). This percentage corresponds to roughly six 
thousand citizens and there were measures that denied entry to a higher participation. 
But there were also measures and efforts to guarantee that the number of participants 
will remain high and thus the process legitimated; but functional as well. Thus, if we 
take into account that the total number of citizens in classical Athens was roughly thirty 
to fifty thousand men, the formal permission of only up to six thousand participants in 
the Ecclesia made the institution a representational sample of the will of the Athenian 
citizens, even though it was not representative as such. In any case, the system was 
certainly not “direct”. A predetermined number of citizens were taking decisions in 
the name of an unspecified and varied number of citizens. To be precise, it ratified or 
amended decisions that were beforehand elaborated by five hundred representatives, 
the prytaneis, with a term of one year. Thus, the Athenian democracy resembled more a 
current representative democracy rather than the spontaneous gatherings in the Agora. 
In other words, in the heart of the Athenian political system was the Boule of the 
five hundred. Without it, the Ecclesia could not be assembled, it could not decide, 
and it could not implement its decisions. Its significance becomes obvious if we take 
into account the fact that it was assembled daily, during all the working days of the 
year (275 days in all). It was the body that followed all the important matters of the 
city continuously and closely. Even then, a body politic of five hundred members that 
functions daily is not usual in history. Notwithstanding the experience of its members, 
such a number makes discussion, debates, and consensus difficult, to say the least. 
The prytaneis were not professional politicians and had no expertise of dealing with 
or of framing the issues of the day. Most of them probably were not even taking the 
floor. It is reasonable to presume that the debates were taking place between seasoned 
prytaneis that happened to be in office for more than one term. Most of them were just 
listening to the elaborated arguments of the few experienced ones, who were taking the 
floor, before voting for or against the proposals. The painful daily presence of those 
five hundred people could only be explained by one presumption: the large number of 
Política y Sociedad
Vol. 53, Núm. 3 (2016):  773-793
Manussos Marangudakis Visions of Brotherhood...
776
representatives was legitimizing the procedures of the Boule as reflecting the will of 
the Athenian people.
The character of the Boule is revealed by the process of its formation. It was 
the representative body of the ten virtual “tribes” that Clisthenes had divided the 
Athenian citizens in. But their selection was based to a much larger extent on the 139 
municipalities (demos) consisted of small or larger geographical units. Every demos 
submitted a number of candidates out of which a certain number was chosen by lot. 
Thus, every demos was actually represented in the Boule, and so every geographical, 
demographic and class aspect of the Athenian body politic. The representation of the 
Athenians was complete. As it has been calculated, the draw was not a crucial aspect of 
the process. In fact, it was regulating the sequence of the office rather than the service 
in the office itself. One-third of all Athenian citizens above thirty years of age had 
served in the Boule at least once in their lifetime during the twenty-five years before 
the Peloponnesian war, and no-one could be chosen for more than two times in their 
lifetime.
This means that the Boule was quite a bureaucratic institution. It was mostly a 
political institution which approved motions and formulated proposals. Thus it was 
guaranteed that the proposals presented in front of the Ecclesia were authoritative and 
as such were accepted. It was a credible body because the number of its members was 
large enough to symbolize the Athenian Demos as a whole.
The second major and contested issue is the selection of the magistrates not by 
vote but choosing by lot. Interestingly enough, the latter was considered to be the 
essence of democracy even by contemporaries (e.g., Aristotle, Politica, 1294b 8; fc. 
1317b 21) in contrast to voting in office that was considered an oligarchic feature. 
Lot, unconceivable in modern democracies, verified the equality of all citizens as it 
did not allow clientelism and favoritism. It nullified electoral campaigns as well as the 
privilege of wealth, eloquence or charisma. Democracy was run by ordinary citizens 
that represented the will of the whole body of citizens.
Yet, the assertion that sortition suits democracy was elaborated strictly by its 
enemies, i.e. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In fact, these reasonable arguments are 
challenged by the historical records of the time. The Athenian democracy itself was 
rationalizing the issue is quite different way. If democracy itself was considering 
sortition to be the essence of the democratic ideal, it would have practice it in the 
process of choosing the most important magistrates, the ones that were commanding 
the city-state. Yet, sortition concerned 1100 magistrates (the 500 prytaneis of the Boule, 
plus six hundred others of various responsibilities) who were chosen to serve for only 
one year, without any right to be reelected in the same post, except of the prytaneis who 
could be drafted for two terms in office. Most of the one hundred supreme magistrates, 
amongst them the generals of the army, the tutors of the youth, the finance magistrates, 
the person responsible for the water supply, and the citizens responsible for the religious 
ceremonies, were elected not by lot but by vote; and the most important ones had the 
right to be reelected over and over again. 
The basic democratic principle was that of the majoritarian rule (in spite of its 
potential drawbacks) and thus the counting of the votes. Sortition, in contrast, was not a 
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democratic conception. In the mind of the citizens it was following aristocratic principles 
which were applied in religious practices or oracles and soothsayers. Allotment, in 
the mind of an Athenian, was not guaranteeing egalitarianism and representation, but 
divine favoritism and praise. It was considered to be preferred for offices of no great 
importance, and its practice did not intent to promote the office, but to downgrade it. 
When there was any doubt on responsibilities, power was given to the electives, not 
the draftees. 
In this context, it is interesting to examine the way the bouleutes were chosen. The 
need to find every year five hundred citizens available for daily meetings suggests 
that most local municipalities (δήμοι) suggested as candidates very few citizens. Thus, 
it is perfectly possible that allotment was not important but only for choosing the 
bouleutes and their replacements (one to two hundred citizens in all). As for the rest of 
the magistrates, they were usually volunteers who had the time and the motivation to 
fill the office. Drafting was a way to assure that the number of the available citizens was 
larger than the number of offices, making selection a swift process.
The Athenians were aware that governing the city was a very serious business to 
be left to chance or to gods. Even for the draftees there was a system of pre-selection 
to exclude the ineligible. Allotment was more an ideology rather than an unqualified 
practice. In principle it was proclaiming all citizens to be aristocrats by nature and by 
culture, and it was this principle that legitimized the regime. 
Last, the issue of distributive justice. The concept is usually considered as 
synonymous to social justice not through economic mechanisms, but through political 
decisions. In fact, the term ‘democracy’ becomes coterminous to socialism under the 
presence of politically induced redistribution. In this argument, political democracy is 
the means to achieve economic equality. But how did the Athenians perceive the two? 
And how did they deal with their potential interconnection? We will begin with the 
margins that the democratic regime had to intervene in property matters. 
According to its principles, the Athenian democracy was not restricted by any 
means to make any decisions it wished to. It had the capacity to give the citizen’s 
right to foreigners; the right to free slaves, and to issue fines and special contributions; 
to declare war and to make peace. Yet, the Athenians never touched on economic 
redistribution. The republic demanded its wealthiest citizens to contribute in matters 
of war, celebrations, and public festivals, but these were acknowledged to be special 
occasions. The wealthy were accepted as such: politically equal, yet economically 
superior to the rest. There was no tax policy whatsoever in Athens targeting the 
Athenians. Taxation was enforced on other city-states that through the establishment 
of the Delian League became the vassals of Athens. Looting, exploitation of the metics 
and slave labor (mainly in the silver mines of Attica), were the means to fund the 
Athenian budget. The Athenian democracy considered its duty to protect the rich as a 
matter of principle as well as of interest. When members of the judiciary (Ηλιαία) were 
undertaking their duties, they were giving the oath of not cancelling individual debts 
neither to redistribute Athenian lands (Xenophon, Hellinika, 1.7.12).
As Demosthenes argued, in the mid fourth century when public finances were 
in miserable conditions, Athens could be optimistic. “There is enough money” he 
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said, gathered in the hands of a few wealthy fellow citizens”. The matter, though, he 
continues, that demanded some thought was the demos should not try to take possession 
of it before the time was right. Even rumors of such an intention before the threat was 
clearly visible would lead the owners of this wealth to hide their possessions. Thus, 
any call for special contribution would have poor results. Only the moment the enemy 
would be at the gates, in an effort to save at least part of their property, the rich will 
freely donate their wealth to the city (Demosthenes, 24.149).
The equality that the Athenian democracy promulgated, and to a large extent 
achieved, was political, not economic (Demosthenes 14.24-26.). On the other hand, the 
Athenian democracy did have an economic dimension, albeit an apophatic one: It was 
not allowing the wealthy to confiscate or appropriate the land of the less wealthy or even 
the poor citizens. And it was certainly not allowing the enslavement of free citizens 
due to debts. In a nutshell, the Athenian democracy was not radical, but conservative, 
aiming to preserve the status quo and not to topple it.
Thus, the Athenian democracy was neither direct nor redistributive. Even though 
many institutional posts were staffed by lot, the Athenians probably would have 
not considered sortition as the quintessential feature of the regime. The Athenian 
democracy cared for two basic principles: to make decisions according to the will of 
the citizenry and to be effective - something that was accomplished for most of the 5th 
century. If there were a fatal weakness in the system, this was its inability to accept 
the expansion of the right to Athenian citizenship beyond the Attica borders. In other 
words, its weakness was not “direct democracy” but “ethnic democracy.” But this is 
another issue altogether.
Accurate and complete representation was the essence of political participation, 
and this was the masterpiece of the Cleisthenian reforms. He re-organized the city in 
municipalities and tribes (φυλαί) in such a way that even a tenth of the citizens, and 
only one tribe, could represent the whole city. Thus, the large number of citizens (thirty 
to fifty thousand men) could not become an obstacle to decision-taking process, or the 
implementation of the laws based on the majority principle. 
Yet, there is an aspect of the Athenian democracy that was truly in line with the 
principle of direct democracy: I refer to the 139 local municipalities the Athenian 
people were divided in. These municipalities were not reflecting any virtual aspect 
of the citizenry as the ten tribes were.2 On the contrary, local municipalities were the 
living and breathing space of every Athenian; his neighborhood. One of the very few 
things that we know of them is that their assemblies were summoned very often and 
these assemblies were responsible of all things local. Also, all (male) citizens were 
obliged to be present and participate in the process. What was required of them was “to 
speak candidly at your risk”;3 it was called parrhesia.4 Parrhesia was the corner-stone 
2 These “tribes” were an intentional mixture of urban and rural populations, of mountain and 
valley and seafaring, an accurate microcosmos reflecting the Athenian macrocosmos
3 Foucault (2001: 15-20)
4 From “pan” (i.e. “comprehensively”) and “rrhese” (i.e. “statement”). 
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of Athenian democracy, the “psychological incubator” of civic virtue, in contrast to 
rhetoria that was associated with fakeness and the corruption of the regime (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics [Book IV, 1124b28]). Based on parrhesia, the municipalities 
were the cells of the Athenian democracy, vivid and vibrant schools of the democratic 
citizenry who voiced his concerns in public (even against popular opinion), before 
some of them were brought to the attention of the bouleutes and the Ecclesia (Wallace, 
2002). 
In all, it would be safe to suggest that the classical Athenian regime was a 
combination of (“low”) direct and (“high”) representative democracy with its most 
important concern being the legitimation of the decision making process as reflecting 
the sincere and unmediated “people’s will”. 
Unfortunately, later on the representative aspect of the regime was downplayed at 
the expense of the direct one. In a famous passage Aristotle declared: “It is accepted 
as democratic when public offices are allocated by lot; and as oligarchic when they 
are filled by election” (Aristotle, Politics 4.1294be). Thus, “who wishes to speak” (τις 
αγορεύειν βούλεται) was proclaimed to be the motto of the “democratic way” and 
this is how it came to be taught in the modern Greek curriculum. Wrongly, it became 
the symbol of the original and pure form of Democracy, and as the argument unfolds, 
modern, representative, democracy is a “pragmatic compromise”, a necessity rather 
than a principle, due to the large number of citizens a modern state is comprised of. 
2. Direct Democracy in Athens today
In Greece, this “compromise” has been challenged by a long list of leftist social groups 
and movements that consider representative democracy to be anything but democratic. 
Rather, they consider it to be a form of oligarchy paying only lip service to genuine 
democracy. When depression and the accompanying social crisis hit Greece in 2009, 
six years ago, disaffection for the government and politics-as-usual (the Metapoliteusis 
era, 1974-2010) joined forces with this, hitherto, marginal promulgation, to form the 
so-called “Syntagma Square movement”. The latter combined resistance to the austerity 
measures enforced by the “troika”5, display of national pride, and a challenge to the 
parliamentary regime as corrupt. 
Starting with the latter, many activists in the Syntagma Square movement accused 
the existing political regime of being a cleptocratic oligarchy, violating citizens’ rights 
and curtailing its constitutional power. Thus protestors’ slogans linked the Square 
movement to the Polytechnic uprising (November 17, 1973) against the Dictatorship 
that ruled Greece for seven years (1967-1974) as the slogan “Bread, Education, Liberty: 
The junta did not end in 1973” (sic) emphasized. As the slogan implied, it dismissed 
the whole post-dictatorship era, even though the latter has been the longest period 
of democratic stability in Greece’s modern history. In the narratives of the Square 
5 “Troika”: the representatives of the International Monetary Fund, the Central European 
Bank and the European Commission
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movement ‘democracy’ became a reference detached from parliamentary institutions. 
As such, “democracy” gradually became a floating signifier to be directly related to 
“memories” of the original, ancient, condition.
A second popular slogan, voiced at the same time, gave the tone of how genuine 
democracy was perceived: “Let it burn, let it burn, the brothel, the Parliament”. The 
Parliament, the symbol and the institution that stands for representative democracy, in 
the eyes of the Syntagma Square movement was delegitimized. In an intentional effort 
to replace it the advocates of the movement brought to life in Syntagma Square itself a 
deliberate experiment of practicing direct democracy. In the lower part of the Square 
(the upper part was occupied by nationalist hard-liners inspired by equally intense hate 
for the Parliament), multiple working groups were established to support and sustain 
ad hoc collectivities made of various social groups mobilized for the occasion (e.g., 
a nursery, a food and beverage rationing group, a media group, a cleaning team, an 
artistic team, a web information team). The working groups were set up to operate 
horizontally, according to the principles of direct democracy. The reason d’être behind 
these actions was meetings and discussions about the economic condition of Greece 
and the possibility of alternative economic policies, thus allowing citizens to voice their 
opinion and act as if direct democracy mattered. This process and participatory ethos 
guided the proceedings of popular assemblies, the main decision-making body of the 
movement. 
Below, I cite some minutes of the first open assembly held at Syntagma Square 
on May 25 2011, which are quite representative of the mood prevalent among the 
protesters:
Any politician, who commits injustices, anyone not respecting popular demands, 
must go to their home or to prison. Their democracy can guarantee neither equality 
nor justice.
We should not be satisfied with being consumers or customers, we should be 
satisfied with being good and responsible citizens.
 We should look at this issue – of our robbed lives – globally. We should connect 
with anything similar happening across the world. It is not only the politicians who 
are to blame, it is all of us with our individualistic behaviour.
We must continue with consistency the revolts of the Arabic world, to lift our-
selves above homelands and nations.We must start formulating demands; for politics 
to change, for the government to go – let’s co-shape our own proposals.
The health system collapses; there are no more disposable materials; people in 
hospitals are in danger; they [politicians] are abandoning us.
Democracy began from here, in Athens. Politics is not something bad. To im-
prove it, let’s take it back into our own hands.
The problems are common and they are what unites us. We should not allow 
[political] banners, or whatever chooses to divide us.
The Spanish people gave us the idea and the cue. We must co-ordinate with the 
rest of the debt-ridden South, we must mobilize. The Spanish people have shown us 
the way.
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They slander civil servants, teachers, lecturers, doctors. Justice is not the 500 
euro [salaries]. They deprive us of dignity.
Greece is at the edge of the cliff and the money of the country is already abroad. 
They robbed us, and continue to do so.2
And this is the resolution by one of the early open assemblies at Syntagma Square:
For a long time now, decisions have been made for us, without us. We are work-
ers, unemployed, pensioners, youth who came to Syntagma to struggle for our lives 
and our futures.
We are here because we know that the solution to our problems can only come 
from us.
We invite all Athenians, the workers, the unemployed and the youth to Syntagma, 
and the entire society to fill up the Squares and to take life into their hands.
There, in the Squares, we shall co-shape all our demands.
We call all workers who will be striking in the coming period to end up and re-
main at Syntagma.
We will not leave the Squares before those who led us here leave: Governments, 
the Troika, Banks, Memorandums and everyone who exploits us.
We say that the debt is not ours.
DIRECT DEMOCRACY NOW!
EQUALITY – JUSTICE – DIGNITY!
The only defeated struggle is the one that was never fought!
Every evening at nine o’clock a general assembly was held (Tsaliki, 2012). The 
selection of speakers was random. Numbers were allocated randomly to participants 
and lots were drawn to determine the order of speakers on the podium (Leontidou, 
2012). Every day, approximately a hundred people expressed their opinions. 
The encampment was not an isolated incident of direct democracy. Instead, its 
activists were, or became, connected to a broader network of neighborhood activists 
who were also organized horizontally to “take into their own hands” the public sphere 
and issues, aiming to a radical transformation of political/social relations. Therefore, 
links were established with other actors (e.g. neighborhood assemblies) to further 
mobilizations and contestation. 
The republican network, that was spread out to the Athenian neighborhoods and 
beyond, but always keeping the Syntagma Square as its charismatic center, constructed 
an alternative public realm in which people interacted, debated, were informed and 
expressed feelings. Next to articulating opinions, the participants also shared feelings 
of anger, confusion and anxiety. Social interaction among strangers was a common 
pattern. Since in the Greek context problems like poverty, unemployment and private 
debt were experienced by numerous and diverse social groups, they were openly 
discussed and debated. 
Nevertheless, the direct-democracy movement differed from the Spanish Indignados 
and the American Occupy movements in regard to inclusiveness. In the latter two 
movements, political activism was coupled with an aspiration to create spaces open to 
diversity (Asen, 2000). The Syntagma Square was different; it was a site of confrontation 
of a highly polarized part of the society against the government. Demonstrators did 
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not simply voice their opposition to austerity policies. They struggled to bring down 
the government and repeal the memorandum. For protestors, the movement’s outcome 
would determine their personal lives and the country’s future. Hence, priority was given 
to immediate political confrontation with the government. In this context, heterogeneity 
of opinions was not allowed but only within the anti-memorandum bloc (e.g. to stay in 
or leave the euro zone). People who were ambivalent about the memorandum were not 
welcomed and different voices were silenced in a quite uncivil manner (Tsaliki, ibid.).
But as was mentioned earlier, hatred for the government, the memorandum, and its 
supporters was not all. The movement was not just a protest one. Rather, it deliberately 
moved on to materialize a new communitas and with it a renewal of the true, direct 
democracy. A series of interviews with members of the Syntagma Square movement 
that were taken in situ during its high days confirm the strong egalitarian temperament 
of the participation.6 Time and again the interviewees expressed their commitment to 
form new social structures and, though these, new political structures based on trust, 
cooperation and collective values. Many of the participants were fully absorbed by 
the task at hand organizing events, participating in debates, offering their services and 
expertise, and mobilizing friends and colleagues to the cause: to create ex nihilo an 
alternative, functional, political and social structure to combat all the ills of democracy-
as-usual. 
A 30-year-old employee in a software company captures the spirit of the movement 
with these words: “At the beginning there was a great sense of being alive… of being in 
the company of people I had never seen before, of expressing your frustration and your 
worries and your dream for true politics coming from the people themselves without 
in-betweens… I spend my daytime at work and then at the Square until late at night… 
I was there, present, body and soul… it did not matter so much what the issue was or 
who spoke, what matter is the fact that we talk as citizens” 
Another participant, an older woman in her forties stated: “My husband was fired 
after ten years of working as a mechanic. I was enraged… still am. A friend of mine told 
me about the happenings at the Syntagma Square and went with her, to check it out. I 
felt good, so many others just like me. I want to be proud again, of myself, my family, 
my country. There were no strangers there. We are all equals, discovering each other, 
other citizens… we are all citizens after all, but we did not exist, not before the crisis… 
I felt like a full, complete, citizen”
A third one, a 33-year-old member of the informal network of anti-authoritarian 
anarchic movement said: “I feel so vindicated that my struggle has become the struggle 
of so many. I do not fool myself thinking that these people have come to join us in 
our struggle against authoritarianism, but it feels good to know that there is not much 
that divide us… it felt good, people who are concerned with pride, and autonomy, 
and community, and not with consumer goods… yes, a year before was exactly what 
6 Marangudakis, M. From Salvation to Purgatory: Cultural Codes and Moral Orders in 
Greece. Propompos: Athens (forthcoming); Marangudakis, M. Kostas Rontos and Maria 
Xenitidou (2013) “State Crisis and Civil Consciousness in Greece”, GreeSE: Hellenic 
Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, 77. 
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they cared for, and probably this is where they will return to after the crisis… but you 
cannot be sure, they just might become communitarians, perhaps they have become 
communitarians!” 
A physician who volunteered to help running a social pharmacy stated: “To offer my 
help is not an extra-ordinary activity. It is the activity that defines me as a citizen. I have 
learned so much the last weeks about myself and about my fellow citizens. This is how 
we should build our new society, a society of providing for the have-nots, a society of 
people who run their own affairs without mediations, without professional politicians. 
I know this might sound like fantasy, but we will all come out of it a bit different, a bit 
more communal. It’s exhilarating… feeling alive, part of the collectivity, offering to 
the people”.
A 37-year-old teacher in a public crèche reflected: “I became involved in politics 
in the late 1990s during the student movement. We were beaten so much by the police 
those days… and slowly I realized that the solution is in the community… is the 
community. I have struggled for the rights of the poor to voice their discontent, and the 
rights of the immigrants to be safe wherever they are… When I look around me I see 
fellow citizens, world-citizens, all looking for common answers to common concerns.” 
There was true commitment expressed in lengthy and arduous tasks (e.g., preparative 
committees, chairing the proceedings, passing resolutions, organizing the events for the 
following days, contacting neighborhood councils, etc). People had to make time at the 
expense of their jobs (for those who still had one), family, etc. For a few months the 
experiment went on. Alas, the Syntagma Square movement faded away a few months 
later falling victim of its own shortcomings. Lack of institutionalization of the social 
networks that participated in the movement, internal strains and tensions, emotional 
fatigue, the infiltration of the movement by lumpen elements that degraded the occasion 
symbolically as well as aesthetically, were all crucial to its downfall. And then, wider, 
political, developments took over the public concern resulting in the absorption of 
movement by the anti-memorandum parties, mainly the radical left party SYRIZA.
What was important for them, and for us, was that these people were not satisfied by 
expressing their rage; rather, they wished to turn it to something productive, and thus 
they combined rage with a wish to renew civic life. What kind of mentality urged them 
to do so? Their efforts and actions became the way some interesting cultural patterns, 
social representations, and moral imperatives of the participants to surface. I turn to the 
analysis of these patterns comparing them to the virtuous citizen of classical Athens.
How compatible is this social movement and the ethical orientations of its members 
with the virtuous communal engagement that we encounter in classical Athens? I will 
endeavor to delineate some anthropological features of the rank and file of the latter, 
following the Weberian typology, before attempting to compare them with those of 
classical, democratic, Athens. This is a highly speculative comparison, and I take it as 
a heuristic tool to consider the potential of the direct-democracy movement to renew 
democracy in contemporary Greece.
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3. The Greek republican; modern and ancient 
There should be little doubt that the novel cultural element that the crisis brought 
forward, and actually precipitated, is direct democracy (republicanism henceforth), 
both as a discourse and, through political action, as a constellation of social movements. 
The Syntagma Square movement, with its local branches, was not a demonstration of 
frustrated citizens who voice their concerns and worries, but a deliberate effort to re-
built republican social structures. “Direct democracy”, the main and key exclamation 
of the social movements’ mobilization, was virtually non-existent twenty years ago and 
hardly noticeable a decade ago. In the Metapoliteusis era “social movements”, such 
as the peace or the feminist movements, were practically party subdivisions following 
party lines. Not anymore; the Syntagma Square movement and its branches have 
not only emancipated themselves from party straightjackets, but they elaborate new 
discourses that emerged out of the Metapoliteusis democratic code, with some crucial 
mutations. 
First and foremost is the rejection of the party-mobilization, charismatic-leader, 
pattern that dominated the political landscape in the ante-crisis era; no submission 
to the leader, and no material reward coming out of such submission was accepted. 
Second, it is the rejection of the national community as a community of blood. Instead, 
the meaning and symbolism of “people” expanded to denote the universal community 
of those who suffer and struggle against injustice; the strong pro-immigrants movement 
that was developed in the last decade was culminated and found clear political 
expression in the Syntagma Square movement. Third, it is the horizontal and egalitarian 
character of voluntary groups that emerged out of the more general social movements: 
the permanent occupation of various public buildings in the name of self-management, 
group initiatives for the rejuvenation of urban sites, cultural happenings, co-operatives, 
and anti-systemic social media belong to this genre. They form a new pattern of social 
action and of social structures, and a new codification of constitutive goods, and as such 
they constitute constituent elements of a new social ethics. 
The contemporary republican discourse suggests a certain detachment from routine, 
fragmented, life, and a predilection for a comprehensive, all-inclusive and meaningful 
life animated and dedicated to communal ethics and communal life. More specifically, 
the demand that was raised during the event was for justice; justice without qualifications 
for economic rationality, debt credibility, accountability to creditors, and so on. The 
world was reduced to some basic bipolar moral principles: The needy vs. the powerful; 
the many vs. the few; the oppressed vs. the oppressors. The world of bureaucratic 
politics and global complexities was rejected for the sake of clarity and the rediscovery 
of the pure essence of democracy. In those meetings “the people” was simplified to 
those rejecting the “memorandum” and with it the old corrupted universe of Greek 
politics and economic life, and above all, the passive social life that accompanied it. 
How can we theorize such developments?
This wish for the detachment from, and, simultaneously, reconstitution of civil life, 
or, better the transformation of civil to civic life altogether, resembles, mutatis mutandis, 
Weber’s religious “acosmistic brotherliness”, a virtuous community committed to 
the development of an organic and moral social life. In principle, while religious 
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brotherliness, as described by Weber, rejects the world as it is, it does not flee from 
the world. It is “world-rejecting”, but not “world-fleeing” as it urges people to stay in 
and work with the world. The basis of world-rejecting moral stand is “acosmistic love” 
(Liebesakosmismus) a concept that denotes a “direct feeling of communion with God” 
which can incline the believer toward “an objectless world-denying love” and moves 
“in the direction of universalistic brotherliness, which goes beyond all barriers of social 
association, often including that of one’s own faith.”7 
Symonds and Pudsey (2006), in a thorough overview of the concept, summarize its 
meaning as follows: “First, it is universal in scope. It applies to all human beings as 
sufferers. Second, it maintains a personal or ethical appreciation of the suffering of the 
other, emphasizing the face-to-face nature of care. Third, it is in tension with the orders 
of this world. As a consequence, it rejects this world as imperfect, thus becoming to a 
great extent world-denying or acosmic (see Bellah (1999) for an extended discussion 
of the meaning of ‘‘acosmism’’). Under this acosmic orientation, only the suffering of 
other human beings is deemed important in this world. Finally, it is uncompromising 
in its dealing with the world. It refuses to accept any other value position as valid or 
worthwhile, and in this sense operates as an ethic of ultimate ends or ‘convictions’ 
(Gesinnungsethik).” (Symonds and Pudsey 2006:135-136)
Bellah’s comment on the acosmistic, world-denial, love of Jesus to the world is 
suggestive: 
For Jesus, whose attitude Weber characterizes as “an absolute indifference to the 
world” (1978:633), love of neighbor is inextricably linked with love of God. What 
Jesus calls “the greatest and first commandment” is the love of God, and the second 
is the love of neighbor (Mt. 22.37-40). And Jesus drastically extends the notion of 
neighbor, as Weber noted, to the stranger and the alien, as in the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan (Lk. 10.25-37), and even to the enemy as in the Sermon on the Mount: “Love 
your enemies and pray for those who persecute you” (Mt. 5.44).8
This might sound parochial - as belonging to a past era of pre-modern religiosity. 
Yet, the basic cognitive framework that the concept introduces, that is, the rejection 
of the world in its complexity as it stands in a given moment in time, the belief in the 
power of the suffering communitas is not restricted by time or history; thus, Weber’s 
hope that the acosmistic love might survive the iron cage of modernity in the form of 
social democracy.9 Yet, at the same time Weber was pessimistic about this prospect 
as the radical ethics of brotherliness is squarely at odds with the political, economic, 
aesthetic, intellectual and erotic value spheres. As these spheres become rationalize, they 
confront head on the religion of brotherliness. In the economic sphere it is the “interest 
struggles of men in the market” that antagonizes acosmistic love; in the political sphere 
7 Weber (1946:330) quoted in R. Bellah, “Max Weber and World-Denying Love: A Look 
at the Historical Sociology of Religion” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 67 (2): 
1999, 277-304. 
8 R. Bellah, op.cit. 
9 Max Weber (1947: 545-546), in Bellah, ibid.
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is coercion. In the intellectual sphere it is the disenchantment intellectual knowledge 
produces. In the aesthetic sphere it is the form that becomes an object of adoration 
independent of content. As for the erotic sphere, “the more sublimated sexuality is, and 
the more principled and relentlessly consistent the salvation ethic of brotherliness is, 
the sharper is the tension between sex and religion”.10 Each and every sphere denies 
the ethic of brotherliness which lies in the heart of salvation religions. This basic 
incompatibility between acosmistic love and modernity, or modern differentiation, 
rationalization and bureaucratization makes it an unstable entity. 
However, I would argue, in cultures with a strong (pre-modern) tradition in it, the 
urge to experience acosmistic love, even as a transitory event, is strong. This is the case 
of the Syntagma Square movement and its demands for “direct democracy”. 
Selective affinity between radical egalitarianism and acosmistic love is obvious, but 
it becomes particularly strong in the Greek case whereas acosmistic love appears strong 
in religious social ethics (Makrides 2013). The Orthodox-theological imperative of 
experiencing emotionally rather than comprehending rationally the divine presence, the 
ecclesiastical congregation as a mystical union of believers, the collapse of linear time 
in sacerdotal events, in our secular era become the foundations for public protests to 
become experiences with transcendental qualitiy.11 In Greece the ideology of republican 
organic ethics and the Jacobin spirit become meaningful precisely through the deep 
cultural-religious patterns and collective representations and images of acosmistic 
love and the power of emotions as living religious experience (Marangudakis 2013). 
In a nutshell, republicanism is understood as a secular version of the undifferentiated 
and mystical Johannine love which must constitute the heart of communal life and 
of individual salvation. More important, this acosmistic love, even in its original, 
Orthodox religious version, is not ideologically blind, but in fact it is suspicious (to say 
the least) of modern liberalism and the West. It rejects, above all, the politics of power 
and capitalism as soul destroying forces12, and it is wary of social differentiation since 
in a differentiated society of multiple formal rationalities the republican hypergood, 
the “moral community”, is fragmented, and the civic public citizen is diluted and 
dissolved into a civil private actor; no common good can be achieved in a civil society 
of privatized individuals (Selingman, 1995: 210). 
It is interesting to notice that, as the Orthodox acosmistic religiosity takes two 
forms, the “defiant monk” and the “conformist priest”, so was the Syntagma Square 
movement structured around two poles: One pole consisted of the anarchist community 
which combines “practicing republicanism” (i.e., part-time living in urban collectivist 
communities) with outbursts of ritualistic violence (e.g., orchestrated violent clashes 
with the police), while the other one consisted of humanitarians which combines 
10 Weber (1946:343), in Bellah, ibid.
11 For the psychological effects of emotive religious experience see Whitehouse (2004); for 
the emotive character of the Orthodox faith see Marangudakis (2013). 
12 For a large-scale overview of Greek citizenship see Mouzelis (1995). For the conflation of 
the religious and the secular identity in Greece since 1974 see Marangudakis (2015).
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participation in republican meetings and protest rallies with philanthropic acts (e.g. 
providing for the poor and homeless, working in social pharmacies and food-shops, 
supporting NGO actions, participating in neighborhood meetings and cultural events). 
It is easy to understand such subdivisions as resulting from social structures and the 
position the individual holds in the social division of labor: Physicians would rather 
prefer to offer their services to a social clinic rather than throw petrol bombs at the 
Syntagma Square. Yet, social division of labor could not explain the justification 
offered by the professional or, for this matter, of any volunteer who explains his/her 
action in the framework of direct democracy and the conjoined rejection of the failed 
system of representative democracy. What these people do is not just to offer a hand 
to the people in need in a moment of severe crisis, but to do so as part of a republican 
ethical life. To trace the roots of mystical republicanism to religious sources we need 
to remind ourselves that Eastern religion is not Oriental, and not world-fleeing. In its 
own mystical framework it stresses the role of the believer as alleviator of human pain 
through acts of mercy and philanthropy, as social responsibility, a synergy of humans 
and God (Makrides, 2005). Since both Christian charity and social responsibility are 
seen through the lenses of mystical Johannine, acosmistic, love and emotive surrender 
of the intellect to the emptied self, neither of them is methodical (Hanganu, 2010). Yet, 
in this unmethodical form, philanthropy is highly effective in moments of crisis such as 
the one Greece faces right now. The drive to charity, in conjunction to the significance 
of in-worldly synergy of social action, in the framework of secular modernity becomes 
not only a fight against poverty but also a fight against the causes of poverty as 
well: injustice, greed, and selfishness. In the framework of the republican ideal of 
organic civic ethics, it becomes a fight against alienation, isolation, and privatization. 
Johannine mystical love becomes the republican undifferentiated organic community 
of fully committed citizens, and the congregation where you meet strangers for “the 
first time” and “you open your heart” and discover how “much in common” you have, 
and how much “you share with each other”. The mystical community of believers in 
Christ becomes the neighborhood political meetings, the Syntagma Square direct-
democracy happenings, or the social media networks that transcend space, and with it, 
republicanism itself turning it in to universal community. 
Stelios Ramfos’ analysis of the Greek psyche captures in ideal-type terms the 
psychological condition of a frustrated mystic remarkably well (Ramfos, 2011). He 
describes it as a “stretched-out will”, a burning desire and an endless expectation 
without any wish to turn it into a practical project. Instead, it remains “an ocean 
of emotions unescorted by reason”. The will remains unattached as it is oriented 
toward a featureless constitutive good instead of an inner conversation with the self; 
as it remains amorphous, the self gladly surrenders to emotiveness. This schismatic 
condition of social life corresponds to the religious meaning of the public sphere: the 
Orthodox faith, communal and mystical as it is, recognizes the public sphere as the 
space to express emotions of justice, but not as the space to put into practice civic 
responsibility. It cultivates a psychological state whereas social actors validate through 
their actions, performative or pro-active those might be, victory upon temptations of 
the fallen, corrupted, and unredeemable world. In this perspective, the performative 
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acts of balaclava wearing, petrol-bomb throwing, anarchists are as religious as that of 
the humanitarians. They simply constitute the two sides of the same coin. 
Yet, such a religious framework does not urge the actor to be methodical or 
socially responsible, since salvation is achieved not though social action, but through 
the emptying of the self and the crushing of individuality. This, combined with a 
rejection of physical, linear, time and the adoption of a flexible and reversible time 
perspective by the Orthodox Church, encourages a less-than-methodical structuration 
of the self. Thus, as its religious equivalent, “mystical republicanism” suffers from lack 
of methodical organization and therefore of the institutionalization of the lifeworld 
–a process that explains the sudden fall and virtual disappearance of the movement. 
Suspicious of organizational formalities and institutionalization processes that makes 
them, symbolically, part of “the system”, and enamored with instances of spontaneous, 
undifferentiated, solidaristic, authentic, altruistic, and for these reasons virtuous 
communities, they experience the basic democratic code in a framework that insists to 
remaining elusive. Thus, the republican actions remain fragmented and transitory; as 
soon as the crisis is over, or the passion subsides, these social actors return to less-than-
meaningful, less-than-moral, routine life. Private life and social-moral action remain 
two domains foreign to each other. 
How close is the model of contemporary practitioner of direct democracy with the 
republican citizen of classical Athens? Not close at all. For starters, there was no axial-
age dissociation of the immanent and the transcendental domains to trigger a project 
of institutional transformation. Instead, the Greek lived in a totally immanent world 
permanently volatile and unpredictable. I explain: His cosmological and ontological 
conceptions were shaped by the idea of Chaos (Χάος). For Hesiod (Theogony, 116) 
the sum of all beings (gods, humans, “things”, “phenomena” and “forces”) is born 
out of chaos, i.e., out of nothingness and of void (χαίνω), and thus, it should not to 
be confused with the later concept of generalized confusion. Yet, in Theogony there 
exists a final place, or a final depth, an inversion of the world, where Chaos is disorder; 
Hesiod calls it Tartaros (717-720, 722-723, 724-730, 731-735). The roots of this world 
–“of the earth and the barren sea”- come out of this huge vessel whose “mouth” is 
bound by a “triple night”. The roots of the world (i.e., cosmos, order), its “other face” 
is this monstrous place. Only in this part of being, where we stand and live, reigns 
-for the moment- Zeus; it is only his presence that turns chaos into order and beauty 
(interchangeably, cosmos).
The world is not anthropocentric; it is not made for the humans and it does not 
“care” for them. There is no transcendental entity to be concerned with the human race, 
and certainly no entity to “love” them. The gods become involved with humans only 
when someone harms or offends them. And then, they are not all-mighty. Above them 
there is irrational and formless Fate (Μοίρα) and it is she who first brought forward 
Ouranos, then Kronos, and then Zeus. Prometheus, in Aeschylus’ version, warns Zeus:
A very solemn piece of insolence 
Spoken like an underling of the Gods! Ye are young!
Ye are young! New come to power and ye suppose 
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Your towered citadel Calamity 
Can never enter! Ah, and have not 
Seen from those pinnacles a two-fold fall 
Of tyrants? And the third, who his brief “now” 
Of lordship arrogates, I shall see yet 
(Prometheus Bound, 955-959).
At list until the end of the fifth century, there is no conception of life after death, and 
if there is, it is not “life” as we know it, but only an echo of it. This is clearly stated 
in Odyssey when Odysseus meats the shadow of Achilles in Hades. There Achilles’ 
shadow tells Odysseus: 
 ‘Say not a word,’ he answered, ‘in death’s favour; I would rather be a paid ser-
vant in a poor man’s house and be above ground than king of kings among the dead’ 
(Rhapsody 11/λ, 488).
This pattern of existence could recognize birth and decay, return to chaos, and potentially, 
rebirth out of chaos. It could not conceptualize an ideal society as a political project 
emerging out of ontological and cosmological principles. Absence of a meaningful 
source of existence, of any comprehensive transcendentalism, meant absence of any 
conception of an ideal world being guaranteed by such a supreme entity or principle. It 
inspired an in-worldly perspective according to which man alone is responsible for his 
fate; anything else, anything above us, or below us, need not concern us. No prophets, 
no messiahs, no destiny is available to provide higher meaning; only the intellect of 
regular human beings. Chaos is already inside us in the form of hubris, i.e. our ignorance 
and inability to recognize the limits of our action. Tragedy warns humans of the danger 
of hubris whenever we cross the line of routine social life seeking truth; it reminds 
the Athenian citizen that there are limits unknown to the social actor beforehand; 
and that he is responsible for any calamity that finds him in his quest. Mostly, that 
it is up to him to discover his limits and avoid hubris. The Greek preoccupation with 
naturalism derives from the awareness of the feebleness of existence: It is only through 
the understanding of the abstract realities of nature that we will find the bearings to 
conceptualize the proper institutions for free citizens (Marangudakis, 2006). Thus, 
while the modern republican wishes to materialize some transcendental truth to “build 
the city of God”, the ancient Athenian republican wished to realign himself with the 
bearings of nature, not in an effort to fulfill his destiny, but out of dignity for himself. It 
was his choice to find truth without the hope of salvation; for this reason, it was a tragic 
truth; he accepted it. 
And instead of relying on a universal brotherhood, the Athenian citizen was molded 
in the furnace of the intense community life. He was directly responsible for the running 
of his household, his immediate demos, and as a hoplite, for the defense of the city of 
Athens. It was through these arduous tasks that his worldview was shaped. These all 
resulted in a definite attitude toward the “state” and his fellow citizens, the celebrated 
civic virtue that was the common feature of all republican city-states’ citizens of the 
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ancient world. He was the carrier of practical action attached to routine issues that 
concerned the demos, the Boule and the Ecclesia. Emotionally he was attached to 
his family, his hoplite companions, and his Athenian community as he experienced it 
though festivals, rituals, and common concerns. In other words, his social relationships 
were “communal” (Vergemeinschaftung) as they were based primarily on face-to-face 
affectual and traditional bonds; the political bonds (the various institutional roles) were 
following, and thus they were embedded on strong foundations. 
Does this mean that the difference between the ancient republican citizen and the 
contemporary one lies in the construction of the “community”? To outline an answer, 
we should go back to Weber’s own theoretical analysis: Acosmistic brotherliness is at 
odds with the political, economic, aesthetic, intellectual and erotic value spheres. As 
these spheres become rationalize, they confront head on the religion of brotherliness. In 
the economic sphere it is the “interest struggles of men in the market” that antagonizes 
acosmistic love; in the political sphere is coercion. In the intellectual sphere it is the 
disenchantment intellectual knowledge produces. In the aesthetic sphere it is the form 
that becomes an object of adoration independent of content. As for the erotic sphere, 
“the more sublimated sexuality is, and the more principled and relentlessly consistent 
the salvation ethic of brotherliness is, the sharper is the tension between sex and 
religion”.13 Each and every sphere denies the ethic of brotherliness which lies in the 
heart of salvation religions. 
In other words, certain crucial aspects of modernity restrict the wish for brotherliness 
to the point of altering its own essence. The analysis of the Syntagma Square movement 
suggests the presence of these restrictions (economic hardship, political disfranchising, 
etc.) as well as the atomistic character of participation (strangers meeting strangers) 
allowing us to reason that it does not constitute a holistic community, or what 
Victor Turner would call a communitas, i.e. a homogenous totality striped of social 
differentiations (Turner 1974: 273-74). But they neither constitute “associative social 
relationships”14 (Vergesellschaftung), the other pole in Weber’s typology of social 
relations, since the participants’ intentional goal was the establishment of new social 
relations based on values rather than interests. The Syntagma Square, direct-democracy, 
movement was factually a protest movement that wished to be a reform movement. It 
failed due to the overwhelming tensions with other value spheres. It was made primarily 
of people enraged by the collapse of their world around them as well as by the collapse 
of their own well-being, who were engulfed by a desire to erase everything and start 
from scratch, or to use Ramfos’ expression, “…with a burning desire and an endless 
expectation without any wish to turn it into a practical project; an ocean of emotions 
unescorted by reason”. The participants wished to bring in life a virtuous community 
of equals, but lack of methodical planning and structural pressures from the outside 
13 Weber (1946:343), in Bellah (1999)
14 “Rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement, whether 
the basis of rational judgment be absolute values or reasons of expediency” (Weber, 1978, 40-
41).
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brought it to an end. Its collapse, a few months later, in the hot days of the summer 
of 2013, when most of the participants had left Athens for summer vacations and the 
Square was in a sorry condition, ended with a wimp. A few voices were raised to protest 
the cleaning up of the Square and the removal of the semi-permanent structures that the 
Greek indignados had installed, but that was all. Eventually it was absorbed by more 
institutionalized organizations, such as the anti-memorandum parties SYRIZA (lower 
Syntagma Square) and Golden Dawn (upper Syntagma Square). 
Thus we arrive at the core of the issue at hand: trust. While the ancients presumed a 
certain level of dependence on each other, of common destiny and communal pride, the 
modern version, as it unfolded in Syntagma Square as well as in other central Squares 
in all major Greek cities revealed not just civic, but civil mistrust. While it is quite 
understandable that the participants rejected the state as unable to provide the basic 
collective goods that it was expected from it, it is not so the deep mistrust toward those 
who were not agreeing with the basic contours of their protest against the troika and the 
memorandum with Greece’s international partners. This could also be understood as a 
consequence of the demands of the movement, but the fact that fellow citizens were 
rejected out of hand and stigmatized as traitors, suggests a certain level of incivility. If 
for the ancients democracy was conceptualized as the rule of laws rather than of persons 
and their wishes, then it is quite possible the Square Movement would be recognized 
by an ancient Athenian as being closer to a factional political movement rather than to 
democratic practice. 
Direct democracy, as it was practiced originally, guaranteed a sense of personal 
responsibility and the legitimation of the wider, representative, democratic regime. 
This combination remains valid even today. In this equation direct democracy is not a 
consubstantial part of a homogenous democratic continuum. Instead, direct democracy 
is substantially different from representative institutions and it could offer something 
that representative democratic institutions cannot: the participation of every member of 
the community as equal, as a fellow brother and sister, rather than as a predetermined, 
biased, member of the government or of the opposition; in other words, to become a 
premise of modern parrhesia, and the trust it cultivates. A reason that the Syntagma 
Square movement failed was that parrhesia and trust was saved only for those with 
similar opinions. Instead of reflecting an acosmistic brotherhood of sufferers, or a 
communitas, it came to reflect de Tocqueville’s “tyranny of the majority”. A direct 
democracy process based on resemblance rather than on inclusion collides head-on 
with the principles of representative democracy. It is the perennial problem of modern 
Greek democracy. 
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